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Incentivizing the Protection of Personally Identifying
Consumer Data After the Home Depot Breach
RYAN F. MANION*
INTRODUCTION
Identity theft in the United States is commonly viewed as a growing
problem. 1 However, the best available data indicates that certain types of
identity theft are growing while other forms are becoming less common.2 The
most discernible problem for individuals worried about identity theft remains
the disclosure of sensitive personal data, such as social security numbers.
Examples of recent data breaches at major companies—Target,3 Sony,4

* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2008,
University of Richmond. I would like to thank all of the members of the Indiana Law Journal
that helped prepare this Note for publication. Further, I would like to thank my family and
close friends, who undoubtedly have endured more conversations about data breaches than
they ever thought possible.
1. See, e.g., Sloane v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 510 F.3d 495, 505 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“[I]dentity theft has emerged over the last decade as one of the fastest growing white-collar
crimes in the United States.”); Wolfe v. MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D.
Tenn. 2007) (finding an “alarming increase in identity theft in recent years”).
2. There was a total of 290,056 identity theft complaints reported to the Federal Trade
Commission’s Consumer Sentinel Network (CSN) in calendar year 2013, which represented
14% of over 2 million complaints received (excluding do-not-call). FED. TRADE COMM’N,
CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY–DECEMBER 2013 3, 5 (2014).
There were 246,035 identity theft complaints to CSN in calendar year 2006, which represented
36% of over 670,000 total complaints. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD AND IDENTITY
THEFT COMPLAINT DATA JANUARY–DECEMBER 2006 3, 5 (2007). The Department of Justice
also keeps statistics on identity theft. Roughly 7% of persons age sixteen or older were victims
of identity theft in 2012. ERIKA HARRELL & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS
OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2012, at 1 (2013). Eighty-five percent of all identity theft incidents
involved the use of an existing account. Id. at 1–2. Meanwhile, the Department of Justice’s
2008 report indicates that about 5% of all persons age sixteen or older dealt with identity theft,
but only 53% of the theft was attempted unauthorized use of existing credit cards, although
that percentage might be higher if other account information, such as bank account numbers,
were added. LYNN LANGTON & MICHAEL P LANTY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF
IDENTITY THEFT, 2008, at 1 (2010). New account fraud numbers are nearly identical between
the 2008 and 2012 reports, with less than 1% of victims reporting this issue in both years. Id.;
HARRELL & LANGTON at 2. The number of existing account incidents grew from 8,339,500 in
2008 to 15,323,500 in 2012. LANGTON & PLANTY at 2; HARRELL & LANGTON at 2. Thus, it
seems that existing account fraud or identity theft is growing, while new account fraud is
remaining stable.
3. Brian Krebs, Sources: Target Investigating Data Breach, KREBSONSECURITY (Dec.
19, 2013, 8:20 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/12/sources-target-investigating-data
-breach/ [http://perma.cc/T9MF-9EDC].
4. Jeff Stone, Sony Hacked: PSN Safe, but Computer System Offline After Malicious
Threat: Report, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/sony
-hacked-psn-safe-computer-system-offline-after-malicious-threat-report-1729073 [http://perma.cc
/7B3C-98QC].
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JPMorgan Chase,5 and the Home Depot,6 to name a few—demonstrate that
disclosure of personal information to unauthorized third parties must be prevented
to ensure security.7
The breach of payment card systems at the Home Depot in 2014 resulted in the
theft of a wealth of information.8 This Note will examine the facts and legal
consequences of the Home Depot breach under three separate frameworks. First, this
Note will examine the Home Depot’s responsibilities arising under existing data
breach notification statutes. Second, this Note examines the Home Depot’s potential
liability if the recent bill introduced by Senator Leahy of Vermont proposing a federal
data breach notification framework becomes law;9 ultimately, however, this Note
finds that state notification statutes fail to adequately protect consumers, and Senator
Leahy’s bill, while better suited than existing state notification statutes, is unlikely
to be effective. Lastly, this Note examines the Home Depot’s potential liability if the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) were to adopt a penalty structure similar to those
in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) and
concludes that a data protection model that imposes similar kinds of penalties for
companies that suffer breaches of sensitive consumer data would better serve the
public interest.10

5. Supriva Kurane, JPMorgan Data Breach Entry Point Identified: NYT, REUTERS (Dec.
22, 2014, 10:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/23/us-jpmorgan-cybersecurity
-idUSKBN0K105R20141223 [http://perma.cc/Y29D-CH43].
6. Brian Krebs, Banks: Credit Card Breach at Home Depot, KREBSONSECURITY (Sept.
2, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/banks-credit-card-breach-at-home
-depot/ [http://perma.cc/HLA2-PAT9].
7. See, e.g., Team BillGuard, Home Depot Data Breach Likely to Strike 60 Million and
Cause Over $2 Billion in Fraud, FOLLOW THE MONEY BY BILLGUARD (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://blog.billguard.com/2014/09/home-depot-data-breach-estimated-impact/ [http://perma.cc
/29FJ-HFJ3].
8. Approximately fifty-six million cards and fifty-three million e-mail addresses were
breached. Press Release, The Home Depot, The Home Depot Reports Findings in Payment
Data Breach Investigation (Nov. 6, 2014); Home Depot: Data Breach Hits 56M Cards,
ALJAZEERA AM. (Sept. 18, 2014, 8:01 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014
/9/18/home-depot-data-breach.html [http://perma.cc/288F-32JF].
9. Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2015, S. 1158, 114th Cong. (2015). An identical
bill exists in the House of Representatives. Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2015, H.R.
2977, 114th Cong. (2015).
10. Similar, but not exactly the same, solutions have been proposed by other authors. See
Rachel Yoo, An Expected Harm Approach to Compensating Consumers for Unauthorized
Information Disclosures, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 50–52 (2012) (proposing a penalty scheme
based off of HITECH but before the most recent Department of Health and Human Services
Amendments were implemented). In addition, others have articulated the need for an omnibus
data breach law. See, e.g., Abraham Shaw, Data Breach: From Notification to Prevention
Using PCI DSS, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 517 (2010); Jill Joerling, Note, Data Breach
Notification Laws: An Argument for a Comprehensive Federal Law to Protect Consumer
Data, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 467 (2010). Such a law is necessary, but this Note focuses on
the penalty scheme that should be included in a federal data protection law.
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I. THE HOME DEPOT BREACH OF 2014
A. The Facts Associated with the Breach
In September 2014, a number of banks identified the Home Depot as the source
of a massive data breach of consumer credit and debit card information.11 Within
days it was revealed that approximately fifty-six million credit and debit cards, along
with about fifty-three million e-mail addresses, had been compromised in a breach
of the Home Depot’s self-checkout computer systems.12 At the time, it was the
second-largest breach of consumer data in history, far surpassing the Target breach
of 2013.13 The damage was extensive. Community banks reissued approximately 7.5
million new credit and debit cards and absorbed nearly $90 million in costs.14 The
expected amount of fraudulent charges as a result of the breach was as high as $3
billion, with an average fraudulent purchase of $332 per compromised card.15
The Home Depot responded quickly to the breach of its payment systems. The
breach was fixed within days, and the Home Depot implemented enhanced
encryption of payment data.16 The implementation of chip-and-PIN security
technology, a more secure way of processing credit and debit card transactions,17 and
enhanced encryption techniques were fast-tracked in the Home Depot’s U.S. stores
(chip-and-PIN technology has been in the Home Depot’s Canadian stores since
2011).18 The Home Depot offered free identity theft protection through AllClear ID
for one year to every person who had made a purchase at an affected Home Depot
store during the breach.19

11. See Krebs, supra note 6.
12. The Home Depot, supra note 8; Nicole Perlroth, Home Depot Says Data from 56
Million Cards Was Taken in Breach, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Sept. 18, 2014, 8:21 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/home-depot-says-data-from-56-million-cards-taken
-in-breach/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=2 [http://perma.cc/4DKD-47PN].
13. Target’s breach was approximately 40 million cards, but others believe it to be worse
for other reasons. See, e.g., Catey Hill, Home Depot’s Data Breach is Worse than Target’s, so
Where’s the Outrage?, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 25, 2014, 11:28 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com
/story/yawn-who-cares-about-home-depots-data-breach-2014-09-24 [http://perma.cc/VBB3
-2Q9D].
14. Phil W. Hudson, Home Depot Data Breach Cost Community Banks $90M, Report
Says, ALB. BUS. REV. (Dec. 21, 2014, 9:20 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/albany/news
/2014/12/21/home-depot-data-breach-cost-community-banks-90m.html [http://perma.cc/YYR4
-QXRA].
15. Team BillGuard, supra note 7; see also Reuters, Data Breach at Home Depot Leads
to Fraud, FORTUNE (Sept. 23, 2014, 7:35 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/23/data-breach-at
-home-depot-leads-to-fraud/ [http://perma.cc/8796-224V] (describing how criminals were using
the stolen credit card information).
16. The Home Depot, supra note 8.
17. Becky Krystal, The Basics of Chip-and-PIN Credit Cards, WASH. POST (May 16,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/the-basics-of-chip-and-pin-credit
-cards/2013/05/16/9e8bdf9a-a13f-11e2-be47-b44febada3a8_story.html [http://perma.cc/K7VJ
-5QUF] (explaining the basics of chip-and-PIN technology).
18. The Home Depot, supra note 8.
19. Press Release, The Home Depot, FAQs: November 6th Email Announcement (Nov.
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B. Legal Fallout of the Breach
The Home Depot reportedly was not vigilant in maintaining the security of its
systems before the breach was discovered.20 As a result, customers have filed a
plethora of lawsuits in numerous jurisdictions,21 despite the recognition by the Home
Depot that it (or the card-issuing financial institution) is responsible for related
fraudulent charges on the compromised payment cards.22 In the wake of the breach,
major class action lawsuits were filed on behalf of consumers in Georgia and
California.23 Those consumer suits were combined with a class action suit on behalf
of affected banks, and now the combined class action suit is pending in Georgia.24
II. POSSIBLE FORMS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
Currently, consumers are protected mostly under state law in the event of a breach.
Some states, however, are considering altering the scope of their laws, and Congress
is considering a federal data breach notification law. Additionally, the FTC has the
power to prevent the use of deceptive trade practices. This Part will explore the
existing sources of consumer protection by examining three state laws that are
indicative of the different approaches adopted by the states, a current proposal from
Senator Leahy in Congress to enact a federal data breach notification law, and the
effectiveness of HIPAA and HITECH regulations on the health care industry.

6, 2014), available at https://corporate.homedepot.com/MediaCenter/Documents/FAQs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4U6-95BP].
20. E.g., Julie Creswell & Nicole Perlroth, Ex-Employees Say Home Depot Left Data
Vulnerable, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/business/ex
-employees-say-home-depot-left-data-vulnerable.html [http://perma.cc/43E6-H3FT]. The
Home Depot also claimed that “the malware used in the attack had not been seen in any prior
attacks.” The Home Depot, supra note 8. The Home Depot’s claim may not be entirely
accurate given reports that the malware was a new variant of the malware that infected Target’s
systems months beforehand. Brian Krebs, Home Depot Hit by Same Malware as Target,
KREBSONSECURITY (Sept. 7, 2014), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/09/home-depot-hit-by
-same-malware-as-target/ [http://perma.cc/2RN6-P93A].
21. See Kevin McGinty, Home Depot Data Breach Litigation: Venue and Consolidation,
MINTZ LEVIN (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.privacyandsecuritymatters.com/2014/11/home
-depot-data-breach-litigation-venue-and-consolidation/ [http://perma.cc/Y9YC-2345].
22. The Home Depot, supra note 19.
23. Earls v. The Home Depot Inc., No. 3:14-cv-4315, (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 24, 2014),
consolidated into In re Home Depot, Inc. Customer Security Breach Litigation, No. 1:14-md
-02583 (N.D. Ga.), available at http://www.girardgibbs.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/Home
-Depot-Data-Breach-Class-Action-Complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/G3XF-GW3N] (original
California complaint); Solak v. The Home Depot, No. 1:14-cv-02856-WSD, (N.D. Ga. filed
Sept. 4, 2014), consolidated into In re Home Depot, Inc. Customer Security Breach Litigation, No.
1:14-md-02583 (N.D. Ga.).
24. In re Home Depot, Inc. Customer Security Breach Litigation, No. 1:14-md-02583
(N.D. Ga. filed Dec. 11, 2014).
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A. State Data Breach Notification Laws
States have attempted to protect their residents from identity theft by ensuring that
swift, remedial action is available to consumers.25 Forty-seven states and the District
of Columbia have passed data breach notification laws requiring notification to
consumers whose personally identifiable information is compromised in a security
breach.26 Typically, these statutes contain similar provisions, including the entities
that must comply, a definition of “personal information,” a definition of “breach,”
the requirements of notice, and any exemptions.27 The following subparts will
examine the breach notification statutes of Georgia and California, where class action
lawsuits against the Home Depot were originally filed, and Indiana to demonstrate
the common provisions of these laws.
1. Georgia
Georgia’s Security Breach of Computerized Personal Information Act requires,
Any information broker or data collector that maintains computerized
data that includes personal information of individuals [to] give notice of
any breach of the security of the system following discovery or
notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of this
state whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.28
A “data collector” is limited to a “state or local agency or subdivision thereof,”29
and an “information broker” is an “entity who, for monetary fees or dues, engages in
whole or in part in the business of collecting, assembling, evaluating, compiling,
reporting, transmitting, transferring, or communicating information concerning
individuals for the primary purpose of furnishing personal information to
nonaffiliated third parties.”30 Personal information is defined as an individual’s first
name or initial and last name combined with: (1) the individual’s social security
number; (2) driver’s license or state identification number; (3) an account, credit

25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-910(1) (2009) (“The privacy and financial security
of individuals is increasingly at risk due to the ever more widespread collection of personal
information by both the private and public sectors.”); Id. § 10-1-910(3) (“Identity theft is one
of the fastest growing crimes committed in this state.”); Id. § 10-1-910(7) (“Victims of identity
theft must act quickly to minimize the damage; therefore, expeditious notification of
unauthorized acquisition and possible misuse of a person’s personal information is
imperative.”).
26. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, (Oct. 22,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security
-breach-notification-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/6BE8-HXBF?type=live]. The states that have
not enacted data breach notification laws are South Dakota, New Mexico, and Alabama. Id.
27. Id.
28. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912(a) (2009).
29. Id. § 10-1-911(2).
30. Id. § 10-1-911(3).
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card, or debit card number; or (4) account passwords, PINs, or other access codes.31
A “breach” occurs when a third party acquires, without authorization, a person’s
electronic data in a manner that “compromises the security, confidentiality, or
integrity of personal information of such individual.”32
If a breach occurs, then an information broker or data collector must notify
affected persons “in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable
delay.”33 However, notice may be delayed if a law enforcement agency determines
that the notification would compromise a criminal investigation.34 Notice may be
given in writing, via telephone, or through electronic media.35 Substitute notice is
available if the cost of notice to all affected individuals exceeds $50,000, if notice
must be given to more than 100,000 people, or if the entity has insufficient contact
information to provide written or telephonic notice.36 Substitute notice requires a data
collector or information broker to provide e-mail notice (if the entity has an e-mail
address), conspicuously post notice of the breach on the entity’s own website, and
notify major statewide media of the breach.37 No private cause of action exists in the
statute.38
This Act has not resulted in a large amount of litigation. To date, only one
published decision cites the Act.39 Information on the number of breach notices
required since the enactment of this law in 2005 appears to be unavailable.
2. California
California was the first state to enact a data breach notification law.40 Since 2003,
this law has served as a model for other states’ data breach laws.41 It requires any
agency, business, or person doing business in California to notify a California
resident if there has been a breach of that person’s unencrypted personal
information.42
Personal information is an individual’s first initial or name and last name, together
with: (1) the individual’s social security number; (2) driver’s license or state
identification number; (3) an account, credit card, or debit card number; (4) medical
information; or (5) health insurance information.43 Alternatively, personal

31. Id. § 10-1-911(6).
32. Id. § 10-1-911(1).
33. Id. § 10-1-912(a).
34. Id. § 10-1-912(c).
35. Id. § 10-1-911(4).
36. Id. § 10-1-911(4)(D).
37. Id.
38. See id. § 10-1-910 to -915.
39. Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., No. 1:12–CV–01157–RWS, 2013 WL 440702
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013). Solak v. The Home Depot also references this statute. See supra note
23 and accompanying text.
40. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, .82 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015); Joerling, supra note 10,
at 471.
41. Joerling, supra note 10, at 473.
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015) (agencies); id. § 1798.82
(persons or businesses); see also Joerling, supra note 10, at 471–72.
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015) (agencies); id. § 1798.82
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information is also “[a] user name or e-mail address, in combination with a password
or security question and answer that would permit access to an online account.”44 A
“breach” occurs when “unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.”45 The notification
provisions of California’s law contain identical language to Georgia’s law.46
California, unlike Georgia, gives a private right of action to consumers for
damages.47 However, the efficacy of this cause of action is limited. Courts have
interpreted the language of the statute to require a showing of actual damages.48 The
statute imposes liability only if an entity fails to notify California consumers in a
timely manner, not for the breach itself.49 Therefore, consumers must be able to
connect the damages they allege to the breached entity’s delayed notice.50

(persons or businesses).
44. Id. § 1798.29 (agencies); id. § 1798.82 (persons or businesses).
45. Id. § 1798.82(a).
46. Id. § 1798.29 (agencies); id. § 1798.82 (persons or businesses). The only two
differences are that telephonic notice is not an option for notification under the California law
and that the threshold requirements of costs and persons affected are higher for substitute
notice in California.
47. Id. § 1798.84(b). Alternatively, an injunction is also available against “[a]ny business
that violates, proposes to violate, or has violated” California’s data breach law. Id.
§ 1798.84(e).
48. See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 1009–10 (S.D. Cal. 2014). During this litigation the plaintiffs alleged that Sony
should be responsible for paying, among other things, the fees to obtain credit monitoring
services and the loss of value of the Sony consoles. Id. at 964–65. The court disagreed because
other courts “have held that a plaintiff must allege actual damages flowing from the
unreasonable delay (and not just the intrusion itself) in order to recover actual damages.” Id.
at 1010. Other federal courts have reached the same conclusion. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 638 (7th Cir. 2007) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims because future,
anticipated harm is not sufficient to sustain a negligence action under Indiana law); Grigsby
v. Valve Corp., No. C12-0553JLR, 2012 WL 5993755, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2012)
(“[W]hen personal information is compromised due to a security breach, there is no cognizable
harm absent actual fraud or identity theft.”); Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913–16
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that an increased risk of identity theft cannot support a claim for
actual damages); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019–21 (D. Minn.
2006) (spending time and money to monitor credit for fraudulent activity does not satisfy the
actual damage requirement).
49. In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 (“The statute does not penalize companies that
simply suffer a security breach or fail to prevent an unauthorized third-party from acquiring
their customers’ personal information; rather, the statute penalizes companies that fail to
disclose such incidents in the manner prescribed by the statute to affected state residents.”
(internal citations omitted)).
50. Id. (holding that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “Plaintiffs [must] allege how
the ten-day delay caused Howe to incur expenses for credit monitoring services, when these
credit monitoring services were purchased, how the loss of use and value of Sony Online
Services and Third Party Services were caused by the delay (and not the intrusion), and how
Plaintiffs’ Consoles diminished in value as a result of the delay.”).
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3. Indiana
Indiana’s data breach statutes apply to state agencies and “data base owners,” a
term that covers both individuals and businesses.51 A data base owner must notify an
Indiana resident if the resident’s unencrypted personal information “was or may have
been acquired by an unauthorized person” or the resident’s encrypted personal
information may have been acquired by someone with the encryption key.52 A state
agency only needs to disclose a breach of unencrypted personal information.53 A data
base owner must also notify the Attorney General of any breach.54 A state agency
does not need to notify the Attorney General of a breach.55 Otherwise, the provisions
of notice are generally the same as the Georgia and California statutes.56
Significant differences exist between Indiana’s data breach statutes and the
statutes of Georgia and California. Indiana’s statute defines “personal information”
differently for state agencies and data base owners. For example, an individual’s
name must be associated with a social security number in order to be considered
“personal information” for a state or local agency.57 However, for data base owners,
an unredacted or unencrypted social security number alone constitutes personal
information.58 Unlike California, Indiana does not include medical information or
health insurance information in the definitions of personal information.59 Notable
notification compliance exceptions exist for data base owners.60 Other provisions
require the data base owner to develop and maintain “reasonable procedures” to
protect the personal information of Indiana residents.61 The statute also prohibits
disposing of unredacted or unencrypted records without taking appropriate measures
to make the records unusable to third parties.62
Actions for injunctions, civil penalties, and reasonable costs against data base
owners are only available to the Attorney General.63 In 2011, Indiana’s Attorney
General reached a settlement worth $100,000 with WellPoint, Inc. for delaying
notice.64 WellPoint also admitted fault, agreed to comply with Indiana’s data breach

51. IND. CODE § 4-1-11-5 (2012) (agencies); id. § 24-4.9-2-3 (2007) (defining a “data base
owner” as “a person that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal
information”); id. § 24-4.9-2-9 (2007) (defining a “person” as an individual or a business).
52. Id. § 24-4.9-3-1 (Supp. 2014).
53. Id. § 4-1-11-5(a) (2012).
54. Id. § 24-4.9-3-1(c) (Supp. 2014).
55. Id. § 4-1-11-5 (2012).
56. See id. § 4-1-11-8 to -9 (2012) (agencies); id. § 24-4.9-3-3 to -4 (2007 & Supp. 2014)
(data base owners).
57. Id. § 4-1-11-3 (2012).
58. Id. § 24-4.9-2-10(1) (2007).
59. Id. § 4-1-11-3 (2012) (agencies); id. § 24-4.9-2-10 (2007) (data base owners).
60. Id. §§ 24-4.9-3-3.5 to -4 (2007 & Supp. 2014).
61. Id. § 24-4.9-3-3.5(b).
62. Id. § 24-4.9-3-3.5(c).
63. Id. §§ 24-4.9-3-3.5(d)–(e), 24-4.9-4-1(a); see Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d
629, 637 n.8 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that the exclusive remedy against a data base owner is an
action by the Attorney General).
64. Press Release, Office of the Indiana Attorney General, Attorney General Reaches
Settlement with WellPoint in Consumer Data Breach (July 5, 2011), available at
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statute, offered free credit monitoring for two years for affected consumers, and
offered to provide up to $50,000 of reimbursement to any customer who suffered
losses due to the breach.65 The Attorney General of Indiana has issued warning letters
to at least forty-seven companies that have delayed issuing notice.66
In 2015, the Indiana legislature introduced Senate Bill 413, which would have
overhauled Indiana’s data protection laws.67 Notably, Senate Bill 413 proposed a new
section to the Indiana Code that defined “data” expansively. Senate Bill 413 defined
data as “electronic or printed information that is collected, maintained, disseminated,
or handled: (1) in a computerized format; (2) on paper; (3) on microfilm; or (4) in
another medium.”68 Other changes to the terminology used in the Code were also
included,69 but other substantive protections would have been added if Senate Bill
413 were ratified. For example, Senate Bill 413 would have required online operators
to delete data on Indiana residents once it is no longer being used for business
purposes.70 Data owners also would have been required to disclose to whom personal
data was shared or sold and post this information in an online privacy policy.71 The
Indiana Attorney General would exclusively enforce violations of these provisions,
but the penalty for noncompliance with the use of personal data would be up to a
$1000 fine for each deceptive act.72 Any failure to comply with the privacy policy
provisions or a failure to properly dispose of data would carry a fine of either $5000
or $50 for each affected Indiana resident, whichever is greater, but the total may not
exceed $150,000.73
B. The Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2015
On April 30, 2015, Senator Patrick J. Leahy introduced the Consumer Privacy
Protection Act of 2015 (CPPA) in the Senate.74 An identical bill was introduced in

http://www.in.gov/portal/news_events/71252.htm [http://perma.cc/KA8R-5S92].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. S.B. 413, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015). The Indiana legislature
failed to pass this bill, and it remains to be seen whether it will be reintroduced. 2015 Security
Breach Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2015-security
-breach-legislation.aspx [http://perma.cc/8C9X-45M2].
68. Ind. S.B. 413 § 4 (proposing a new section to the Indiana Code: § 24-4.9-2-2.7).
69. E.g., id. § 7 (proposing a new section to the Indiana Code: § 24-4.9-2-3.2) (defining
“data user”).
70. Id. § 15 (proposing amendments to IND. CODE § 24-4.9-3-3.5). This section would
require that a data user “retain sensitive personal information only as reasonably necessary”
either for “a legitimate business, government, academic or nonprofit purpose” or for
“compliance with applicable law.” Id. (proposing amendment to IND. CODE § 24-4.9-3-3.5
(c)(1)). The data user also may not use personal information unless it is reasonably necessary
for a legitimate purpose and the data subject has not opted out of the use. Id. (proposing
amendment to IND. CODE § 24-4.9-3-3.5(c)(3)).
71. Id. (proposing amendments to IND. CODE § 24-4.9-3-3.5(b)(2), (e)).
72. Id. (proposing amendments to IND. CODE § 24-4.9-3-3.5(f)–(g)).
73. Id. (proposing amendments to IND. CODE § 24-4.9-3-3.5(h)–(j)).
74. S. 1158, 114th Cong. (2015). A substantially similar bill—the Personal Data Privacy
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the House of Representatives.75 The CPPA proposes criminal penalties for
concealing a data breach and requires certain entities that collect information on at
least 10,000 people to implement a security and privacy program that complies with
standards articulated by the FTC.76 Currently, the respective Senate and House bills
are in committees.77
In the event of a security breach, “a covered entity shall . . . notify any resident of
the United States whose sensitive personally identifiable information has been, or is
reasonably believed to have been, accessed or acquired.”78 Notice must also be given
to the FTC.79 A security breach occurs when there is reason to believe that there has
been “unauthorized access to or acquisition of sensitive personally identifiable
information.”80 Notice of a breach must be given “without unreasonable delay
following the discovery” of the breach, which may not exceed thirty days unless an
exception applies.81 Written, telephonic, or electronic (e-mail) notice must be given
to an affected individual, but if more than 5000 individuals in one state are affected
by a security breach and personal notice is not possible, then a covered entity must
notify major media outlets in the state of the breach and post notice in a “clear and
conspicuous” place on its website.82 The definition of “sensitive personally
identifiable information” includes, inter alia, “[a] financial account number or credit
or debit card number in combination with any security code, access code, or
password.”83
However, certain entities are exempted from the scope of the Act. Financial
institutions, covered entities under HIPAA, and service providers of third-party
electronic communications are excluded from the provisions of the CPPA.84 In order

and Security Act of 2014—was introduced by Senator Leahy in the 113th Congress on January
8, 2014. This bill ultimately did not make it out of committees. S. 1897, 113th Cong. (2014).
75. H.R. 2977, 114th Cong. (2015).
76. S. 1158, 114th Cong. §§ 101, 201 (2015).
77. The Senate bill is in the Committee on the Judiciary. Committees: S.1158—114th
Congress (2015–16), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate
-bill/1158/committees [https://perma.cc/8X9G-TGRX]. The House bill is in the Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations. Committees: H.R.2977—114th
Congress (2015–16), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house
-bill/2977/committees [https://perma.cc/AQP6-TDLB]. No action has been taken on either bill
since it was introduced.
78. S. 1158 § 211(a). This obligation extends to third parties that maintain systems or data
on behalf of a covered entity. Id. § 211(b)(1).
79. Id. § 216.
80. Id. § 3(9)(A).
81. Id. § 211(c)(1)–(2).
82. Id. § 213. Telephonic notice may not be accomplished using a prerecorded message,
and e-mail notice to an individual must not contain a request for personal information. Id.
83. Id. § 3(10). Other examples of “sensitive personally identifiable information” include
a social security number, a driver’s license number, a passport number, a unique electronic
account identifier (such as an account number or username) in combination with a password
or security question and answer, unique biometric data, information concerning an individual’s
geographic location, or password-protected digital photographs and videos. Id.
84. Id. § 201(c). A “service provider” is defined as “a business entity that provides
electronic data transmission, routing, intermediate and transient storage, or connections to its
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to be exempted from the CPPA, financial institutions must be in compliance with the
requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and covered entities under HIPAA
and HITECH must be in compliance with the data security provisions of those
regulations.85
Unlike the data breach notification laws, the CPPA would require businesses to
take proactive measures. Businesses would be required to perform risk assessments
to identify vulnerabilities to their data systems before they are breached.86
Companies would also need to regularly assess and monitor their data privacy and
security programs, including performing vulnerability testing and updating security
programs in light of technological advances, threats, or changing business
arrangements.87 Additionally, there would be safe harbor provisions that could
exempt an entity from the notice requirements. A breached entity would not need to
identify consumers if it determines that any sensitive personally identifiable
information is “rendered unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable” by the use of
security technologies such as encryption, and that there is “no reasonable likelihood”
that the breach will result in the data being misused.88
There is no private cause of action under the CPPA.89 The Attorney General of
the United States, the Attorneys General of the States, and the FTC have the right to
enforce the provisions of the CPPA and seek injunctive relief and civil penalties.90
The maximum that any entity can be fined under the CPPA is $5 million or the
product of the number of persons affected and $16,500, whichever is fewer, for any
violation, unless the violation is found to be “willful or intentional.”91 If a violation
is found by a court to be either “willful or intentional,” then the court may impose an
additional penalty that is not to exceed $5 million.92
C. HIPAA and HITECH
HIPAA93 and HITECH94 provide the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) with the ability to enact regulations protecting sensitive health information.95

system or network, where the business entity providing such services does not select or modify
the content of the electronic data, is not the sender or the intended recipient of the data, and
the business entity transmits, routes, or provides connections for sensitive personally
identifiable information in a manner that sensitive personally identifiable information is
undifferentiated from other types of data that such business entity transmits, routes, or provides
connections.” Id. § 3(11).
85. Id. § 201(c)(1)–(2).
86. Id. § 202(a)(3)–(4).
87. Id. § 202(c), (e).
88. Id. § 212(b).
89. Id. § 204(b).
90. Id. §§ 203, 204, 218, 219.
91. Id. § 203(b)(1)–(2).
92. Id. § 203(b)(4).
93. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936.
94. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2009).
95. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 (2014); id. pt. 164(A), (E).
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These regulations apply to “covered entities” under the Act, which include health
care providers who conduct covered health care transactions electronically, health
plans, and health care clearinghouses.96 HIPAA and HITECH contain a notice
provision for all breaches of sensitive health information.97
The HHS has enacted five rules regarding the use of medical information.98
HITECH strengthened the Privacy Rule, the Security Rule, and the Enforcement
Rule.99 In addition, the HHS modified the interpretation of HIPAA and HITECH in
2013.100
1. The Privacy Rule
The Privacy Rule requires covered entities under HIPAA to have safeguards in
place to ensure the privacy of protected health information.101 Protected health
information is individually identifiable health information that is either transmitted
or maintained in electronic or other media.102 Covered entities must also have
contracts with their business associates to ensure that the business associates
safeguard protected health information.103
Covered entities may disclose or use an individual’s protected health information
without consent only if it is used for treatment, payment, or health care operations.104
The general rule is that covered entities may not use or disclose protected health
information without valid authorization.105 Individuals may request that a covered
entity not use or disclose health information, and if the entity agrees then it must
adhere to its agreement absent exigent circumstances.106 The amount of protected
health information disclosed must always be the smallest amount necessary to
achieve a given purpose.107 Further, covered entities must notify individuals of the
use of protected health information,108 and the covered entity must have a designated
privacy official and a contact person or office responsible for dealing with HIPAA
complaints.109 Moreover, all employees of a covered entity must receive training on
how to properly protect and handle protected health information.110

96. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5567 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164).
97. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17932 (West 2013).
98. HIPAA Administrative Simplification Statute and Rules, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/index.html
[http://perma.cc/LEY8-DVTD].
99. See infra notes 101–142 and accompanying text. See generally 123 Stat. 226.
100. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566.
101. 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 (2014); id. pt. 164(A), (E).
102. Id. § 160.103.
103. Id. § 160.102–.103.
104. Id. § 164.506(a).
105. Id. § 160.508(a)(1).
106. Id. § 164.502(c), .522(a).
107. Id. § 164.502(b).
108. Id. § 164.528.
109. Id. § 164.530(a).
110. Id. § 164.530(b).
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2. The Security Rule
The Security Rule requires a covered entity to “protect against any reasonably
anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of” electronic protected
health information.111 HITECH extended the requirements of the Security Rule to
covered entities’ business associates, so that a business associate is no longer
regulated by contractual employment agreements.112
HITECH’s amendments to the Security Rule require notice of a data security
breach in the event that an individual’s unsecured protected health information is
disclosed.113 Unsecured information is simply information that is not encrypted or is
otherwise usable.114 Similar to the state data breach notification statutes, HITECH
requires that affected individuals must be notified “without unreasonable delay” and
that if a breach involving 500 people or more occurs, the covered entity must notify
the media and the HHS.115
3. The Enforcement Rule
The Enforcement Rule establishes rules governing the compliance responsibilities
of covered entities with respect to the enforcement process.116 HIPAA states that the
Secretary of the HHS “shall impose [a penalty] on any person who violates a
provision of this part.”117 These penalties are tiered based on the mental knowledge
of the breach by a covered entity. Four categories of mental knowledge exist: an
entity did not know or could not have reasonably known a violation occurred; an
entity had reasonable cause to know a violation occurred or would occur; an entity
corrected a violation due to willful neglect; and an entity had a violation due to willful
neglect that has not been corrected.118 A violation by an entity that did not or could
not have known of the violation is viewed as less egregious than a violation due to
willful neglect, and the bands of monetary penalties reflect this reality.119 Thus, a
covered entity that does not know he or she violated HIPAA could pay as little as
$100, while a violation due to willful neglect could result in a penalty as high as
$50,000 per violation.120 Maximum penalties for the total calendar year for these
violations exist as well, so under no circumstances will a covered entity pay more
than $1.5 million in a calendar year.121
The Secretary of the HHS will consider certain factors when determining if a
penalty is warranted.122 These factors include: the nature and extent of the violation,

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. § 164.306(a)(2).
42 U.S.C.A. § 17931(a) (West 2013).
Id. § 17932.
Id. § 17932(h).
Id. § 17932(d)(1), (e)(4).
45 C.F.R. pt. 160(C)–(E) (2014).
42 U.S.C.S. § 1320d-5(a) (Lexis 2008 & Supp. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
45 C.F.R. §§ 160.404, .408 (2014).
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including the number of persons affected; the nature and extent of the harm incurred;
a history of prior compliance with regulations; and the financial condition of the
covered entity, including the size of the covered entity.123 No fine may be levied on
a covered entity that demonstrates that its violation was not willful and that it has
corrected the violation within thirty days of knowing (or within thirty days of the
date the entity reasonably should have known) the violation occurred.124 The
Secretary has the right to waive any penalty that is incurred as the result of a
nonwillful violation of HIPAA or HITECH “to the extent that the payment of the
penalty would be excessive relative to the violation.”125
4. 2013 Modifications to HIPAA and HITECH: The Final Omnibus Rule
On January 25, 2013, the HHS released its modifications to the HIPAA and
HITECH rules.126 These modifications, among other things, substantively changed
the Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules and altered the HITECH breach
notification requirements.127
The Privacy Rule now requires covered entities’ business associates to use or
disclose protected health information only as required by contract or pursuant to the
HIPAA and HITECH regulations.128 Business associates may also be held directly
liable for violations of the Privacy or Security Rules.129 The modifications also
prohibit the sale of any protected health information without the affirmative consent
of the individual.130 Covered entities must redraft their privacy policies in response
to these modifications and redistribute them to individuals.131
The Enforcement Rule is modified to incorporate the penalty structure from the
HITECH Act.132 Covered entities and business associates are now responsible for the
acts of their agents.133 The modifications also change the penalty structure so that
any violation of HIPAA rules results in a penalty according to the proposed structure
under HITECH.134 The former maximum fine an entity could accrue in a single

123. Id. § 160.408.
124. Id. § 160.410(c).
125. Id. § 160.412.
126. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164).
127. Id. at 5566 (“This omnibus final rule is comprised of . . . [f]inal modifications to the
HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules . . . .”).
128. Id. at 5570–76; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 17934 (West 2013); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)–(e)
(2014).
129. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566 (“Covered entities and business associates must comply with the
applicable requirements of this final rule by September 23, 2013.”).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 5581 (“[W]e believe that the notion that a principal is liable for the acts of its
agent should not be an unfamiliar concept to covered entities and business associates.”); see
45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c) (2014).
134. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5582–83; see 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2014).
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calendar year was $25,000, but that has now changed to $1.5 million for all kinds of
violations.135 These penalties will be determined on a case-by-case basis136 and
certain affirmative defenses allow a covered entity to avoid a fine altogether.137 The
modifications also specifically list the factors the Secretary should examine when
determining the proper civil monetary penalty.138
Additionally, the 2013 modifications altered HIPAA and HITECH regulations
relating to notification requirements in the event that a covered entity suffers a data
breach. An impermissible use or disclosure of protected health information is now
presumed to be a breach unless the covered entity “demonstrates that there is a low
probability that the protected health information has been compromised.”139
Previously, the interim final rule had required a covered entity to demonstrate that
an individual was at no significant risk of harm in order to forego notice.140 A covered
entity now may demonstrate that there is a low probability that data has been
compromised by assessing the risk of at least the following four factors: the nature
and extent of the protected information involved, including the types of identifiers
and risks of re-identification; the identity of the unauthorized user or viewer of the
protected information; whether the protected information was actually acquired or
viewed; and the extent to which risk to the information has been mitigated.141 The
modifications also strengthen the breached entity’s duty to notify individuals that
data has been obtained by an unauthorized third party.142
III. THE HOME DEPOT BREACH AS APPLIED
The Home Depot’s data breach presents some difficult issues for the existing
regime of state statutes. For example, many consumers would not even be able to
bring a suit against the Home Depot for a variety of reasons.143 Senator Leahy’s
proposed bill would be more effective than the variety of state laws, but it also would
fail to provide an adequate remedy. However, if the Home Depot were subject to
HIPAA and HITECH-style penalties, there may be more recourse available.

135. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5582–83; see 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2014).
136. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5583 (“[T]he Department will not impose the maximum penalty amount
in all cases but will rather determine the amount of a penalty on a case-by-case basis.”).
137. Id. at 5585–86; see 45 C.F.R. § 160.410 (2014) (listing affirmative defenses).
138. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5584–85; see 45 C.F.R. § 160.408 (2014).
139. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5641.
140. Id. at 5641–42 (“[B]reach notification is not required under the final rule if a covered
entity or business associate, as applicable, demonstrates through a risk assessment that there
is a low probability that the protected health information has been compromised, rather than
demonstrate that there is no significant risk of harm to the individual as was provided under
the interim final rule.”).
141. Id. at 5642.
142. Id. at 5648 (“[I]t may be an ‘unreasonable delay’ to wait until the 60th day to provide
notification.”).
143. See supra note 38, 48–50, 63 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A.

158

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 91:143

A. State Breach Notification Laws
Good reason exists to believe that any suit filed against the Home Depot under
the state data breach notification statutes will fail.144 Georgia’s statute only applies
to “data collectors” and “information brokers.”145 The Home Depot is not a state
entity, and therefore cannot qualify as a “data collector,” nor can the Home Depot
qualify as an “information broker” because it does not collect information for costs
or fees.146 Thus it would appear that Georgia’s statute would not apply to the Home
Depot. California’s statute applies to businesses and would cover the Home Depot,
as would Indiana’s statute, which covers “data base owners.”147
“Personal information” was compromised during the Home Depot breach. The
definition of personal information covers an individual’s name taken together with
credit or debit card information.148 Likewise, the loss of personal information
qualifies as a “breach” under the state notification statutes. A “breach” occurs when
an unauthorized person gains access to unencrypted personal information, which
happened when individuals’ card information was compromised by the malware in
the Home Depot’s system.149
The state notification statutes require the Home Depot merely to notify
individuals of the breach of their data “without unreasonable delay.”150 The breach
affected roughly fifty-six million cards, well above the threshold number that would
require the company to notify statewide media and the State Attorneys General of
the breach.151 The Home Depot confirmed the initial breach through a press release
and to major media outlets on September 8,152 a mere six days after it was initially
suspected.153 The Home Depot also confirmed on September 18 that it had closed off
the vulnerability in its system.154 It also appears that the Home Depot has adequately

144. See, e.g., Jeff Landis, Home Depot Moves to Dismiss Data Breach Class Action,
ZWILLGEN BLOG (Oct. 17, 2014), http://blog.zwillgen.com/2014/10/17/home-depot-moves
-dismiss-data-breach-class-action/ [http://perma.cc/4U28-7B8Y].
145. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912 (2009).
146. Id. § 10-1-911(2)–(3).
147. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-2-3
(2007) (defining a “data base owner” as “a person that owns or licenses computerized data
that includes personal information”); id. § 24-4.9-2-9 (2007) (defining a “person” as an
individual or a business).
148. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911(6) (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1 (Supp. 2015);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/5 (West Supp. 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(g) (Supp.
2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1347(6) (Supp. 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98(1)(b)
(West 2009).
149. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015).
150. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912(a) (2009).
151. The Home Depot, supra note 8; see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-3-1(b) (Supp.
2014).
152. Maggie McGrath, Home Depot Confirms Data Breach, Investigating Transactions from
April Onward, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2014, 5:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/maggiemcgrath/2014/09/08/home-depot-confirms-data-breach-investigating-transactions-from
-april-onward/ [http://perma.cc/E6U4-MB4V].
153. Krebs, supra note 6.
154. The Home Depot, supra note 8.
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notified the State Attorneys General because there is no action pending against the
Home Depot for failure to notify. This means no action against the Home Depot
would exist in Indiana.
California’s statute grants a private right of action to consumers, but it is unlikely
that such actions will succeed.155 Courts require plaintiffs to demonstrate there are
actual damages that can be recovered.156 However, the Home Depot has agreed to
pay for fraudulent charges, together with the card-issuing banks, on the compromised
cards.157 The extra time that consumers must spend monitoring their credit and
dealing with security issues is viewed as too speculative by the courts.158 Unless the
plaintiffs are able to show that they suffered actual identity theft or account fraud as
a direct result of the Home Depot taking six days to confirm that a breach occurred,
the courts are likely to dismiss any action.159
B. The Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2015
The Home Depot would have been subject to some liability under the proposed
Consumer Privacy Protection Act if it were law at the time of the breach. The Act
applies to the Home Depot because it is a business entity engaged in interstate
commerce that transmits sensitive personally identifying information.160 The Home
Depot would be required to take proactive security measures under section 202 of
the Act161 and would be required to notify individuals in the event of a breach of
sensitive personally identifying information.162
A breach of sensitive personally identifiable information, as defined by the CPPA,
would have occurred. The data’s security and confidentiality was compromised, and
a third party acquired the data without authorization.163 Similarly, credit and debit
card information was taken, which is one of the definitions of sensitive personally
identifiable information.164
The Home Depot’s potential liability would arise from its failure to take proactive
security measures. Section 202 would require the Home Depot to identify potential
vulnerabilities to its data systems and take adequate steps to protect against a
breach.165 Reports that the Home Depot was aware of the risks to its payment system
may be sufficient to trigger liability under this section.166 Further, the malware used
in the Home Depot attack was a similar variant of the malware that breached Target’s

155. See Landis, supra note 143; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
157. The Home Depot, supra note 19.
158. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also Landis, supra note 143.
160. The Home Depot, supra note 8 (describing the Home Depot as “the world’s largest
home improvement specialty retailer” with over 2200 stores nationwide).
161. Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2015, S. 1158, 114th Cong. § 202 (2015).
162. Id. § 211.
163. Id. § 3(9)(A).
164. Id. § 3(10)(B); see The Home Depot, supra note 8.
165. S. 1158, § 202(a), (c), (e).
166. S. 1158, § 202(a)(3)-(4) (outlining liability); Creswell & Perlroth, supra note 20
(reporting that the Home Depot knew of risks to its payment system).
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systems six months earlier.167 The Home Depot should have been able to take more
proactive measures to guard against this kind of malware. Therefore, it is likely that
the Home Depot would not be in compliance with section 202 and would be subject
to an action for failure to adequately protect sensitive personally identifiable
information.168
The Home Depot would likely not face liability for a failure to notify under the
CPPA. The Home Depot confirmed that a breach had occurred within thirty days of
first disclosing the possibility of a breach and presumably notified all affected
individuals during that time period.169 The Home Depot would have needed to notify
individuals using a proper method of notice, such as by phone, mail, or e-mail.170
The Home Depot would easily meet this requirement, as it took immediate steps to
reach out to the affected individuals and notify them of the breach.171 The breach
affected, on average, over one million cards in each state, which may have triggered
obligations for the Home Depot to notify major media outlets of the breach and to
place notice on its website.172 Again, the Home Depot confirmed the breach to major
media outlets six days after the initial reports, easily within the thirty-day window
provided for in the CPPA.173
Violations of section 202 are subject to an action by the U.S. Attorney General,
the Federal Trade Commission, and State Attorneys General.174 The maximum
penalty that the Home Depot could incur for the breach under the CPPA is $5
million.175 The Home Depot could be fined up to $5 million more if the violation is
found by a court to be willful or intentional.176 The Home Depot’s violation of this
section might be considered willful if the Home Depot was aware of the
vulnerabilities to its system and neglected to rectify those vulnerabilities before the
breach occurred.177 However, given that the Home Depot did not actively
disseminate the payment card information, it is more likely that it would not be
considered to have willfully violated section 202, thereby capping the potential civil
penalty at $5 million.178

167. See Krebs, supra note 20.
168. Under the enforcement provisions of sections 203 and 204, an action against the Home
Depot could be brought by the U.S. Attorney General, the Federal Trade Commission, or the
State Attorneys General. S. 1158, §§ 203–204. The maximum penalty that the Home Depot
would be subjected to would be $5 million, although the number of affected credit and debit
cards was approximately fifty-six million. See S. 1158 § 203(b)(2); Perlroth, supra note 12.
169. See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 151.
170. S. 1158, §§ 211(a), 213(1).
171. See Information Originally Posted in 2014: Customer Update on Data Breach, THE
HOME DEPOT, https://corporate.homedepot.com/mediacenter/pages/statement1.aspx [https:
//perma.cc/2MEC-J8VN].
172. S. 1158, § 213(2).
173. See McGrath, supra note 151.
174. S. 1158, §§ 203–204.
175. Id. § 203(b)(2).
176. Id. § 203(b)(3)–(4).
177. Creswell & Perlroth, supra note 20.
178. See S. 1158, § 203(b)(2); The Home Depot, supra note 8 (indicating that information
was stolen).
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The Home Depot’s profits and sales make any fine of $5 million a drop in the
bucket that is unlikely to incentivize different behavior. In fiscal year 2013, the Home
Depot made $5.4 billion in profit on $78.8 billion in sales.179 A fine of .0926% of
annual profit seems like a slap on the wrist for the breach of such a large amount of
sensitive personally identifiable information. However, it is possible that the Home
Depot (or other companies that suffer a large-scale breach of data) would be able to
negotiate a penalty that is substantially lower than $5 million. This is an attractive
strategy for smaller companies that would not be able to afford to pay a larger fine
without encountering financial difficulties, but the $5 million ceiling for nonwillful
violations of section 202 will fail to motivate larger companies with billion-dollar
profits because the fine represents such a low percentage of their total revenue.
C. HIPAA and HITECH
If the FTC adopted a nearly identical version of the HHS administrative rules
governing HIPAA and HITECH, then the government would be able to levy a
substantial fine on the Home Depot.180
The tiered penalty structure under the new modifications is applied when a
covered entity violates one of the HHS regulations.181 The Home Depot would likely
fall into the band of penalties for “reasonable cause” or corrected willful neglect.182
An entity would qualify for the reasonable cause band if, by exercising reasonable
diligence, the entity would have known it violated an HHS rule.183 Willful neglect
means an entity had a “conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference to the
obligation to comply” with a rule.184

179. The Home Depot, supra note 8.
180. Currently the FTC is able to enforce provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2012). See A Brief Overview of
the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (Jul. 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority
[https://perma.cc/2NK9-GQHZ]. Under both the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and
the Clayton Act, the FTC is able to seek injunctive relief for violations of its cease and desist
orders. Id. The FTC can also seek equitable relief for reporting violations of the Clayton Act.
Id. Civil damages actions by the FTC are available for violations of cease and desist orders
under the FTCA ($16,000 per violation) and the Clayton Act ($5000 per violation). Id.
Reporting violations under the Clayton Act can also be enforced by the FTC in an action for
civil damages ($11,000 per violation). Id.
181. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5582–83 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164).
182. See supra Part II.C.
183. 45 C.F.R. § 160.401 (2014). Other entities, such as the IRS, also distinguish between
reasonable cause and willful neglect standards. IRC § 6724(a) (2012) states that “[n]o penalty
shall be imposed under this part with respect to any failure if it is shown that such failure is
due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect.” In order to demonstrate that reasonable
cause exists, “a person must establish either that (1) there were certain specific mitigating
factors with respect to the failure or (2) the failure arose from events beyond the person’s
control.” 14A JEROME WAHLERT, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 55:99, Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2015).
184. 45 C.F.R. § 160.401 (2014).
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The Home Depot’s failure to adequately prepare for the attack on its systems and
subsequent breach, a “reasonably anticipated threat[] or hazard[] to the security and
integrity of” electronic personal information, would be a violation of the Security
Rule as defined by HIPAA (if the FTC were to adopt a similar rule for businesses).185
The Home Depot failed to anticipate that a similar Target-style attack on its stores
might occur using the same kind of malware.186 If true, the reports that the Home
Depot knew of the risks and ignored them would likely mean that Home Depot was
willfully neglecting its security.187 However, the Home Depot would have adequately
met the notice requirements articulated under the HIPAA Privacy Rule and Security
Rule as articulated in the modifications, because it notified people “without
unreasonable delay” and within six days of becoming aware of the breach.188
The FTC would be free to impose penalties on the Home Depot under the willful
neglect category. Under HIPAA and HITECH, these penalties can range from
$10,000 to $50,000 per violation with a ceiling of $1.5 million for all violations.189
The FTC would need to evaluate factors to determine the proper scope of the
penalty.190 The Home Depot would not be able to avail itself of the exclusion to
monetary fines because its violation would be considered willful.191 The FTC would
see that the extent of the harm incurred as a result of the Home Depot’s failure to secure
its payment systems was immense, including fifty-six million cards, fifty-three million
e-mail addresses, and up to $3 billion in fraudulent charges.192 The financial condition
of the Home Depot is such that it could pay a higher fine, given that it made $5.4
billion in profit during fiscal year 2013.193 And given the size of the Home Depot’s
operations, including over 2000 stores in the United States alone, the factors would
weigh in favor of the FTC levying a large fine on the Home Depot.194 Thus, if the
bands and ceilings of penalties stayed the same, the Home Depot would likely be
fined up to $1.5 million for the data breach.
IV. PROPOSAL
The data security requirements on companies under current state statutes is
woefully inadequate to give consumers a sense of protection and confidence. Pending

185. Id. § 164.306(a).
186. Krebs, supra note 20 (reporting that the same kind of malware used in the Home
Depot breach was used to infiltrate Target’s payment systems nearly six months prior to the
Home Depot breach).
187. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.401 (2014).
188. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5654 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
160, 164) (“[C]overed entities . . . must still provide notification of such breaches to affected
individuals without unreasonable delay . . . .”).
189. Id. at 5583; see 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2014).
190. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5584–85; 45 C.F.R. § 160.408 (2014).
191. 45 C.F.R. § 160.410(c) (2014).
192. Team BillGuard, supra note 7; see also The Home Depot, supra note 8.
193. The Home Depot, supra note 8.
194. Id.
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federal legislation is a step in the right direction but fails to properly incentivize
companies because the penalty provisions are not strong enough. The FTC should
immediately be given authority, as it would under the CPPA, to fine companies that
fail to adequately secure and protect consumers’ personally identifiable information.
The FTC should adopt the expectation that companies will “[p]rotect against any
reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security and integrity of” personally
identifiable information, including credit and debit card numbers, from HIPAA’s
Security Rule.195 It also should adopt the requirements of the Privacy Rule, namely
that all companies must train every employee on the proper handling of personal
information. The bands of penalties found in the 2013 HIPAA and HITECH
modifications and the Enforcement Rule should be applied to companies that fail to
comply with the FTC’s version of these rules. This would give the FTC the authority
to fine companies that suffer data breaches due to security oversights based on the
culpability level of the company. Further, the affirmative defenses offered by the
modifications and the HIPAA Enforcement Rule should also be adopted so that a
company will not be fined without willfully neglecting its security obligations. This
prevents a system where businesses are subjected to strict liability for being the target
of hackers with sophisticated malware. Additionally, a private cause of action is not
ideal because granting such an action to consumers potentially holds companies
liable for being a victim of a hack.
However, the current penalty bands should be reworked by the FTC, and each
violation should have clearly marked parameters so businesses know what is
expected if a data breach occurs. The monetary ceilings of the bands should be
removed entirely, and the fine should be based on the same four factors used by the
Secretary of the HHS: (1) the nature and extent of the breach, including the number
of persons affected; (2) the nature and extent of the harm incurred; (3) whether the
business has a history of prior compliance with regulations; and (4) the financial
condition of the business, including the size of the business.196 This will allow the
FTC to properly fine companies based on culpability, the size of the breach, and the
size of the company. Larger companies would pay heftier fines in order to incentivize
compliance with the FTC regulations. The absence of a ceiling for violations ensures
that a fine will not be a slap on the wrist. Rather, companies will seek to comply with
the regulations to avoid the penalties and will not neglect the security of their
systems.
CONCLUSION
The Home Depot breach of customer credit and debit card information illuminates
the need for new regulations. The Home Depot allegedly failed to secure its payment
systems properly, resulting in the breach of millions of consumer records, including
e-mail addresses and payment card data. The ramifications from this breach for
consumers and the Home Depot are immense. The Home Depot and other companies

195. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2) (2014).
196. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5584 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164); see
45 C.F.R. § 160.408 (2014).
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must be incentivized to properly secure customer data. State data breach notification
statutes fail to do this because damages must be shown from the failure to notify
properly. The Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2015 proposed by Senator Leahy
would be a step in the right direction, but the FTC should be given the power to fine
companies that suffer breaches. The framework provided by HIPAA and HITECH
better incentivizes covered entities’ compliance with data security regulations. The
FTC should adopt similar regulations immediately, including regulations based on
HIPAA’s Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules. Affirmative defenses and
exceptions would ensure that a company is not being held strictly liable for being the
target of hackers. But the FTC would be able to fine a company according to how
culpable the company was in neglecting security measures, the size of the company,
and history of compliance with similar regulations. Unlike current legislation, such
a framework would effectively encourage companies’ compliance with data security
regulations and would result in a more proactive approach to data security from the
private sector.

